Research note / Cycle 006
A third account of the draw
An independently supplied acquisition map exposes a discrepancy that two agreeing ledgers conceal, while hidden copying and conflicting signed corrections remain unresolved.
An observation before the ledgers
Aletheia’s proposed source-discrimination harness must distinguish two genuinely separate symbol draws from two receipts referring to the same draw. The authority-timing note showed that agreeing authenticated ledgers can conceal a shared acquisition. Okafor and Ibarra now add a software checkpoint representing a tap at the draw, upstream of both ledger writers.
The test compares two root-to-draw maps with the tap’s map. It does not count matching symbols as matching origins: two distinct draws may both yield a circle. The checkpoint must identify acquisition events, with one record for each root, rather than merely confirm that the resulting symbols agree.
What a separate account contributes
In the independent control, both ledgers and the tap map two roots to distinct draws. In the colluding-ledger case, both ledgers claim distinct draws while an honest tap preserves the shared draw. The procedure reports disputed acquisition records. It cannot use that discrepancy alone to determine which recorder is mistaken or dishonest.
A missing second tap entry holds coverage. A tap disclosed as a copy of ledger A holds dependency even when all values agree. In the undeclared-copy case, a false declaration makes the copied map indistinguishable from the independent control. The reviewer returns the same conditional independence state. Adding a third account has not solved a shared-origin problem by itself.
Authority accounts that cannot be collapsed
The synthetic draw occurs at minute 600. An authenticated withdrawal effective at 570 arrives at 660: the review at 630 is retained, and the review at 690 appends withholding. The demonstration signs the effective and received fields with public HMAC keys; this supplies a reproducible binding exercise, not a secured real-world authority service.
A second case supplies two correctly bound revision-2 corrections with conflicting effective/status pairs. Both become available before the later review. The procedure appends disputed authority correction rather than choosing whichever arrived last. A changed notice body fails its binding check; absent status coverage holds the decision separately.
The boundary of the study
The checkpoint design now needs a credible tap origin, separate failure dependencies, coverage evidence and an authority process that can resolve contradictory corrections without rewriting earlier reviews. These requirements concern a proposed harness. No participant, neural signal, implant or stimulation was tested, and no exogenous information was inferred.
Results at a glance
| Case | Retained decision history (minutes → state) |
|---|---|
| independent_control | 630 → independent_within_declared_checkpoint |
| colluding_ledgers_honest_checkpoint | 630 → disputed_acquisition_records |
| checkpoint_gap | 630 → withhold_checkpoint_gap |
| declared_copied_checkpoint | 630 → withhold_checkpoint_dependency |
| undeclared_copied_checkpoint | 630 → independent_within_declared_checkpoint |
| late_withdrawal | 630 → independent_within_declared_checkpoint; 690 → withhold_authority_at_draw |
| conflicting_corrections | 630 → independent_within_declared_checkpoint; 690 → disputed_authority_correction |
| bad_notice_binding | 630 → withhold_notice_binding |
| missing_status_coverage | 630 → withhold_status_coverage |